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Abstract 
This paper deals with impacts of fossil fuel subsidy reform on economic growth, focusing mostly 
on the countries of the Middle East and East Africa (MENA) region. We first develop a 
theoretical growth model, and use it to demonstrate that a country can achieve higher levels of 
economic growth if the government reduces its energy subsidies. Our empirical work confirms 
the main results from the theoretical model. That is, a country that initially subsidizes its fossil 
fuels, and then eliminates or reduces these subsidies, will as a result experience higher economic 
GDP per capita growth, higher employment, and greater levels of labor force participation, 
especially among the youth. These effects are strongest in countries where fuel subsidies are 
generally high, such as those in the MENA Region. We here predict that for a given level of 
subsidy, a 20 cents average increase in the gasoline and diesel price per liter can increase the 
GDP per capita growth rate by about 0.46 percent and 0.24 percent, respectively. In the MENA 
countries, savings in subsidies seem to be earmarked by the region’s governments to health 
expenditures, education expenditures and public investment in infrastructure. These channels 
appear to be strong contributing factors to higher long-run growth when fuel subsidies are 
reduced. 
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1 Introduction 
Not much work has been done towards developing general equilibrium models in which 
both the removal of energy subsidies (and implementation of fuel taxes) and the investment of 
these subsidy savings by the government in productive public investment could i) create the 
appropriate environment to promote entrepreneurship and private investment; and ii) influence 
rates of economic growth. Neither has there been studies analyzing empirically how elimination 
of subsidies could foster economic growth, and the channels by which such growth could take 
place. The purpose of this paper is to fill up that gap. We aim to provide a partial characterization 
of when economies with efficient fuel taxation can be expected to grow faster than economies 
with high fuel subsidies. To achieve this goal, we develop and test empirically a model in which 
fuel subsidy savings (or collected taxes) can influence the allocation of resources (i.e. labor and 
reproducible capital) in ways that have implications for real rates of economic growth. We use a 
newly collected data set for the empirical work. 
Why shall we worry about the consequences of having subsidies? Subsidies contribute to 
fiscal insolvency, resources are diverted from productive public investment, can lead to major 
distortions in the production and consumption structure of these economies, benefits mostly high 
income households which are usually a very small proportion of the population, and increase fuel 
consumption at suboptimal levels. The latter contributes to global warming and environmental 
pollution. Such attributes affect the overall long-run performance, particularly, economic growth.  
Petroleum subsidies present major environmental and economic problems. Recent work by 
the International Monetary Fund (2013) indicates that on a “pre-tax” basis1, subsidies for 
petroleum products, electricity, natural gas, and coal reached $480 billion in 2011 (0.7 percent of 
global GDP or 2 percent of total government revenues). It further reports that the costs of 
subsidies are even higher among oil exporters, which account for about two-thirds of the total. 
On a “post-tax” basis, subsidies are much higher at $1.9 trillion (2½ percent of global GDP or 8 
percent of total government revenues. A prominent feature of energy markets in many countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is also the existence of energy subsidies, for 
a range of energy goods including motor fuels, electricity, and natural gas. Considering a 20-year 
                                                 
1
  The IMF defines and constructs the “pre-tax” subsidy as the transfer to bridge the gap between domestic and 
international prices and the “post-tax” subsidy will include in addition an estimate of negative externalities from 
energy consumption. See Perry and Small (2005) and Clements et al. (2013) for further details. 
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period or longer, the level of subsidy has increased in many of these countries. The World Bank 
(2014) has indicated that even after reforms, energy subsidies in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen still 
account for more than 5 percent of their GDP. This number is even higher for Algeria, Iran, Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia, more than 10 percent of their GDP. Reforming energy prices in the MENA 
region, by letting energy consumers face prices close to their optimal levels, is likely to lead to 
measurable benefits for these countries. 
Most analysis, both theoretical and empirical, of energy pricing reform to date has focused 
on fiscal and environmental/climate impacts of such reform (e.g. Perry and Small (2005)), and 
on the effect on household welfare (e.g. Gangopadhyay, Ramaswami and Wadhwa (2005); Arze 
del Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012); Coady, Parry, Sears and Shang (2015)). We here 
analyze how fuel taxation will affect economic growth. 
Even though the issue of the relationship between economic growth and energy pricing, such 
as that for gasoline and diesel, is a very important economic policy topic today, hardly any work 
exists to shed light on such relationships. The existent empirical literature concentrates on the 
effects of energy prices or energy consumption on GDP, and not the effects of energy taxes or 
subsidies which are the focus here. This empirical work also uses statistical methods such as 
error-correction based panel co-integration techniques, and/or a panel autoregressive approach 
(e.g. Mehrara (2007) and Berk and Yetkiner (2013)).  
Our empirical work will focus on the countries of the MENA region, but part of the analysis 
will also consider other countries and World Bank regions, for comparison purposes but also to 
provide a robust analysis, covering the period 1998-2012.  
Besides studying how the elimination of energy subsidies promotes economic growth in 
countries that implement enduring energy price reforms by reducing fuel subsidies, we also aim 
to shed light empirically on the following: i) whether reductions in fuel price subsidies 
ameliorate government budget deficits; ii) determining the economic channels by which a 
decrease in fuel price subsidies affect economic growth (e.g. are public subsidy expenditures 
redirected to increased spending on health, infrastructure, education, to subsequently affect 
growth?); and iii) how these relevant economic channels affect the relationship between energy 
subsidies and GPD per capita growth. 
At least two important lessons can be drawn from our theoretical model. First, a reduction in 
fuel subsidies will trigger positive economic growth. Nonetheless, if existing fuel taxes are 
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already set at too high levels that induce drastic declines in private savings (i.e. income after 
paying income and fuel taxes and energy expenses), this economy could experience a decline in 
growth. Thus, to achieve maximal economic growth, an economy cannot solely rely on public 
investment financed with tax revenues. It is also necessary to have sound and sustained private 
savings. Second, it is crucial that the government invests its reserves from fuel subsidy 
reductions or tax increases, in high-return long-run investment that helps to increase productivity 
capacity and give private agents the adequate incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activities.  
 From our empirical results we draw the following conclusions. First, using a cross-section 
approach which considers all the countries in the World Bank regions, we find that for a given 
level of average subsidy, a 20 cents average increase in the diesel and gasoline price has caused 
an average increase in the GDP per capita growth rate by about by about 0.28 percent and 0.46 
percent, respectively. Second, with a panel approach for each of the World Bank regions, we find 
that in most regions, a decrease in fuel (diesel and gasoline) subsidies today leads to increased 
economic growth in the subsequent years. The exceptions are countries in the European and 
Central Asia (ECA) region which already have relative high fuel taxes. Countries like those in 
MENA, might need to cope with immediate reductions in their GDP per capita growth and 
employment (specially affecting the younger population) in response to more “correct” (higher) 
fuel price levels. However, as countries in the MENA region redirect subsidy expenditures 
toward more productive investments such as infrastructure and other public goods (i.e. health 
and education), they will in succeeding periods experience higher economic growth and 
employment. Third, our panel analysis in fact shows us that there is a significant positive effect 
of reducing fuel subsidies on employment and labor force participation especially among the 
young population, aged 15 to 25, and induces higher social and public investments by the 
government. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts from the data. 
Section 3 describes our theoretical model which analyzes how fuel subsidies affect economic 
growth. Section 4 contains the econometric modeling while Section 5 includes our empirical 
results. Section 6 reports the empirical analysis on how fuel subsidy savings of the countries in 
the MENA region are redirected toward health and infrastructure spending and serve as channels 
to promote employment and growth. We analyze in Section 7 how these channels affect the 
relationship between energy subsidies and GPD per capita growth. Section 8 concludes. 
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2 Data 
 
The data set has been gathered by the Environment and Energy Team at the Development 
Research Department of the World Bank (DECEE), and contains also relevant and important 
political and economic variables for this study taken from the World Bank Data Depository, 
IMF, Penn World Table, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). The 
data are at the annual basis for the period 1998-2012. 
Figures 1a and 1b display the diesel and gas price gaps as defined by Koplow (2009) 2 
against the average changes in these price gaps respectively, over the period of 1998 to 2012 for 
countries in the MENA and ECA regions. The price gap can be negative (i.e. fuel is subsidized) 
or positive (i.e. fuel is taxed).  
Figure 1. MENA Countries 
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Figure 1a. Average Koplow's diesel price gap and its average change
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Figure 1b. Average Koplow's gasoline price gap and its average change
 
 
It is noticeable that a large number of MENA countries have had relatively higher price gaps 
or high average levels of diesel and gasoline subsidies than most ECA countries. The noticeable 
exceptions in ECA are Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 
especially with respect to diesel. Moreover, the MENA countries not only have had, over the 
period of 1998 and 2012, higher levels of fuel subsidies, but also these subsidy levels have 
become larger over time. This can be seen in Figures (1a) and (1b) that the average change on 
their fuel price gaps have become more negative. This only means that MENA countries have 
made few attempts to improve their fuel pricing situation over these years. 
                                                 
2
 This is equal to the domestic fuel retail price minus the average U.S. retail price, minus 10 cents per liter for fuel 
importers (corresponding to the average U.S. tax), and minus an additional 10 cents per liter for fuel exporters. 
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Figure 2. ECA Countries 
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Figure 2a. Average Koplow's diesel price gap and its average change
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Figure 2b. Average Koplow's gasoline price gap and its average change
 
 
 
Figure 3 indicates that the MENA countries have had on average between 2003 and 2011, 
higher total pre-tax fossil-fuel energy subsidies (on petroleum, electricity, natural gas and coal) 
than public expenditures on health. The MENA countries will most likely benefit, in terms of 
higher productive public investment and economic growth, from reducing their fiscal costs due 
to energy subsidies.  
 
Figure 3. MENA Countries. Pre-Tax Subsidies and Spending in Health 
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Del Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012) and Manzoor, Shahmoradi, and Haqiqi (2012) 
in addition stress that in most MENA countries where fuel subsidies are very large, the economy 
is generally much more energy-intensive, and the increase in prices triggered by subsidy reform 
would have a bigger impact than in economies that have already adapted to the high oil prices. 
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Del Granado et al. (2012) also indicate that the removal of subsidies will eliminate price 
distortions, not only for fuels but also for final goods whose production depend on fuels. The 
overall allocation of resources would improve; many energy-intensive activities, with an 
artificial competitive advantage originated by subsidies, would be eliminated; and energy-saving 
investments would become more profitable. 
 
3 How elimination of energy subsidies can contribute to economic growth: An 
analytical perspective 
We study how elimination of energy subsidies (e.g. taxing energy consumption) promotes 
higher productivity capacity and raises rates of economic growth by considering an endogenous 
growth model (Paul Romer 1986, 1990).  
Our contribution consists in explaining how such entrepreneurial activity will be more 
encouraged in an environment where the government uses fuel taxes to invest in infrastructure 
and public goods in order to facilitate innovation, and higher productivity and profits in the 
private sector. A failure from the government to reduce energy subsidies, will leave this 
government with fewer resources to provide the necessary public services. This can result in a 
disproportionally large number of agents who would prefer to “overconsume” and retire early, 
and not become entrepreneurs. There will be then too many early retirees and fewer participants 
in the labor force which could cause the Social Security System to go bankrupt or become 
unfunded. 
Agents should normally prefer to pay their taxes since the government is more suitable to 
make such public investments and take advantage of economies of scale. If agents instead self-
finance their public investment projects, they face the risk of having to prematurely liquidate 
their investments to meet primary needs in the event of an income shock. This problem can be 
avoided by having a government that can maximize the welfare of the whole economy by 
collecting taxes and invest in public goods from which all agents can benefit.  
Our theoretical model encompasses the following lines of reasoning for the government and 
private agent activities: i) the government collects income and fuel taxes from a large number of 
agents in the first period of their life when they work, and invests the tax revenues in 
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infrastructure, R & D, public goods and producible capital in general3; ii) in the second period of 
the agents’ life, a certain proportion of them will prefer to consume from their net income right 
away, and retire early from the labor force claiming their pensions; others prefer to forego early 
consumption and become entrepreneurs and benefit from the government’s infrastructure 
investments because these increase their productive capacity, and thereby promoting higher 
profits and economic growth; iii) the government, using the law of large numbers, make an 
assessment about how many will leave the labor force early (and receive pensions) and consume 
early; and how many will become entrepreneurs and contribute to increasing production and 
employment; iv) the government accordingly invests certain amount of the collected taxes in 
short-run investments in very liquid assets (e.g. in bank savings, mutual funds) to satisfy the 
demand of agents who retire early from the labor force, and the rest in long-term public 
investments; v) after paying taxes, individuals will have savings which they can invest and 
obtain a return if these investments are not withdrawn prematurely. 
 
3.1 Main Assumptions 
The economy consists of: 
• A sequence of three-period-lived, overlapping generations. Each generation includes a 
continuum of agents. Time is indexed by t=0,1,2,… 
• At each t, there is an equal number of young and old agents. 
• All young generations are identical, which means that there is no population growth. Each 
young agent is endowed with a single unit of labor supplied inelastically. There are no labor 
endowments at ages 2 and 3.  
• At t=0 there is an initial old generation, endowed with an initial per-firm working capital of 
k0 units, and an initial “middle-aged” generation, which is endowed with an initial per-firm 
capital stock of k1 units at t=1. 
• Except for the initial old and middle-aged generations, agents have no endowment of capital 
(and consumption good) at any date. All working capital is owned by a subset of old agents, 
which are the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs only use “their own” capital which together with 
                                                 
3
 We here focus on energy subsidies but the reasoning can be extended to subsidies to any sort of consumption 
subsidies. 
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the young generation of workers, produce a single consumption good. There is not capital 
rental market. 
• The economy has a single consumption good and a capital good, and a non-renewable natural 
resource. The consumption of natural resource is determined after all taxes are paid. Each 
individual pays either taxes or receive subsidies for every unit of consumption of these 
resources. 
• The government has the opportunity of allocating one unit of its tax revenues, collected from 
labor income plus energy taxes in the short-term investment (e.g. savings, mutual funds) at 
time t that gives a return ρ > 0 units of consumption good at t+1. At this point, this type of 
investment that is not consumed is liquidated. On the other hand, when the government 
allocates one unit of its tax revenues in a long-run investment (e.g. public goods, R&D, 
infrastructure), it will transform its tax revenues into producible capital at t+2 at the rate of 
return R.4 If the long-run investment is liquidated at t+1, its “scrap value” is zero units. Thus, 
we have a government that can make two types of investments: 1) in liquid assets; and 2) 
illiquid long-term assets. 
• Once agents decide to be entrepreneurs, they use at time t, their net incomes (income after 
taxes) to make long-run savings or invest in assets such as stocks to receive a return Rb > 0 at 
t+2 (at age-3) for every unit of net income saved/invested for two periods. An earlier 
withdrawing of savings will give an Rb = 0. The government cannot without difficulty affect 
these agents’ preferences on how to spend and distribute their incomes after paying taxes and 
consuming the natural resource that contributes to the generation of energy.5 
• Defining ci as age i consumption, the utility function of all young agents is a CRRA type: 
2 3
1 2 3
( )( , , ; ) ;c cu c c c
γϕϕ
γ
−+
= −
           (1) 
where γ>-1, and φ is an individual-specific random variable that is realized at the beginning 
of age-2 (at t+1) and determines a saver’s consumption preferences according to the 
following probability distribution: 
                                                 
4
 We here think of long-run investments as the ones entrepreneurs need to produce the consumption good and boot 
entrepreneurs’ productivity capacity. 
5
 We do not model the non-renewable resource assets/financial markets not because they are not important but 
because we would like instead to concentrate on the effects that subsidies and taxes and the government 
administration of such taxes could have on the economy. 
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0 1
1
with probability
with probability
piϕ
pi
−
= 

 .           (2) 
(1) and (2) indicate that young agents do not care to consume when they are young, i.e. at 
age-1 (at t). A proportion (1 - pi) will retire early and consume at age-2. On the other side, a 
fraction pi of the individuals will only care about consuming at age-3 (i.e. φ = 1) and will 
rather choose to become entrepreneurs. By forgoing consumption at age-2 (t+1), they will be 
able to receive at age-3 (t+2): i) their returns in terms of producible capital (including better 
infrastructure and public goods) from paying their taxes to the government; and ii) their 
returns from investing their private savings.  
• kt is the working capital that is held by an individual entrepreneur at t. We will have tk  which 
represents the “average resources” (capital and financial assets) available to each 
entrepreneur at t. An entrepreneur who employs Lt units of labor at t, paying each a real wage 
wt, produces the consumption good according to the following production function: 
1
t t t ty k k L
δ θ θ−
=
.
            (3) 
θ ∈ (0 ,1), δ = 1 – θ. (δ is distinguished from 1 – θ to emphasize that it represents an 
“external effect” in production. Capital is totally depreciated after one period. 
 
3.2 Entrepreneurs’ decisions and the labor market 
Assuming the production function (3) and taking as given the real wage rate, the demand for 
labor that maximizes the representative entrepreneur’s profits will be: 
1/(1 ) t
t t
t
kL k
w
θδθ −
=  
 
 .           (4) 
If we note that the condition for labor market equilibrium is Lt = 1/pi, after averaging (4) over 
firms and equating the result to 1/pi, we find that the equilibrium real wage at t is: 
(1 )t tw k θθ pi= − .            (5) 
Given that the marginal value of the working capital is θ tk k
θ-1L1-θ, the level of profits per 
entrepreneur,Φ, will be: 
1
t t t tk k L
δ θ θθ −Φ = .            (6) 
By using (4), (5) and (6), we can find the reduced form for profits per entrepreneur at t: 
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t tkθψΦ = ; where ψ=piθ-1  .          (7) 
3.3 The government’s public investment decisions 
     The government receives labor income taxes, Twt, from the young generation which leaves 
them with a disposable income equal to ((1-T)wt). A percentage e of this disposable income will 
be used for energy consumption, ((1-T)wt e), which will be also taxed by the government. This 
taxed energy consumption will be then (τ (1-T)wt e). If the government instead subsidize energy, 
individuals will received subsidies equal (-τ (1-T)wt e).6  
   For each unit of tax received, (t+τ(1-T)e), the government invests a proportion ft ∈[0,1] units 
in the short-run project; and a proportion nt ∈[0,1] units of it in the long-run project. Thus, each 
unit of tax is allocated as follows: 
     ft + nt = 1.             (8) 
    If an individual decides to retire from the labor force and consume at age-2 (at t+1), he/she 
receives r1t units of the consumption good for each unit of tax paid at t to the government. 
Individuals who claim the return for their paid taxes at age-3 (at t+2) and decide to be 
entrepreneurs to produce the consumption good, will receive a return r2t of reproducible capital 
for each unit of tax paid at t to the government. The following constraints should be then 
satisfied: 
     (1-pi)r1t =  ρft .             (9) 
           pitr2t = Rnt .           (10) 
    Constraint (9) says that the returns that the government obtains from its short-term investment 
ρft; should be enough to satisfy the total demand for consumption goods of middle-aged 
individuals (age-2) which is equal to (1-pi)r1t, in exchange for the taxes paid when they were 
young. Thus, the returns from the government’s investment decisions should be equal to the 
pledged returns (equal to (1-pi)r1t) to private individuals on each unit their paid taxes in terms of 
units of consumption goods. On the other hand, constraint (10) indicates that the returns that the 
government will obtain at t+2 from its long-run investment, Rnt, should be enough to satisfy the 
                                                 
6
 τ represents the taxes to be paid to the government to compensate for the externalities that the consumption of fuel 
generates in addition to financing the government’s public finances. This can be associated as the post-tax rate as 
defined by the IMF. 
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promised returns (equal to pi 2ktr ) to the entrepreneurs on each unit of their paid taxes in terms of 
reproducible capital including infrastructure. 
Note that agents will have a net income equal to (1 – T)(1 – e(1+τ))wt (i.e. after 
deducting energy consumption and paying income and fuel taxes) which they can save or invest 
in assets. 
The problem of the government is to maximize the expected utility of the representative 
young taxpayer at time t, while anticipating that some middle-aged agents may retire early and 
the rest will become entrepreneurs. Taking into account the law of large numbers, the 
government will maximize the following expected utility of the representative tax-payer, 
evaluated at t:  
( )
[ ]
1
2
1 (1 )(1 (1 )) ( )
(1 )(1 (1 )) ( ( (1 .
 1
) )
t t
tt b t
t t
t
EU T e w r T
T e w R r T
w T w e
w T w e
γ
γ
pi
τ
γ
pi
τ θψ τ
γ
τ
−
−
 −
= − − − + + −    

+

 
− − + + + −

−


        (11) 
This expression follows from the fact that at t, all young agents (of age-1) pay their taxes, 
on their income and energy consumption. Also, a fraction 1-pi of agents (of age-2) are expected 
to retire from the labor force, demand their pensions prematurely, and has consumption only at 
age-2 (at t+1) equal to (1-T)(1-e(1+τ))wt + r1t(Twt + τ (1-T)wt e) (i.e. i.e. φ = 0). A fraction pi are 
however expected to become entrepreneurs, instead of retiring early, and forgo consumption 
until they are of age-3, i.e. φ = 1. Each entrepreneur receives r2t units of the reproducible capital 
good for every unit of tax paid. These entrepreneurs will consume i) their profits derived from 
their entrepreneurial activity equal to θψkt+2 (see equation (7)) , where, kt+2  = r2t(Twt + τ (1-T)wt 
e); plus ii) their returns on their savings or investments in assets equal to (1-T)(1-e(1+τ))wtRb. 
We rewrite equation (11) taking into account the constraints (8), (9) and (10):  
(1 )1{ } (1 )(1 (1 )) ( (1 ) )
1
(1 )(1 (1 )) ( (1 ) ) .
t
t
t t
t
t
b t t
nMax EU Max T e w T T w e
nR T e w R T w ewT
w
γ
γ
pi
τ ρ
γ pi
pi
τ θψ
τ
γ pi
τ
−
−
   −−  
= − − − + + − −   
−  
    
− − + + −    
   
+
 
+
                           (12) 
12 
 
 
The government finds the optimal share of tax revenues to be invested in long-run 
projects, nt, by maximizing (12) with respect to nt, which is: 
 
  ( )
/(1 ) /(1 )
1
1 2
(1 )(1 (1 )) ( ) ( (1 ) )( )
( (1 ) )
b
t
T e R R T t e C
n
T T e C C
γ γ γ γτ ρ θψ τ
τ
+ + − − + − + + − 
=
+ − +
;  where      (13) 
 
(1 2 )/(1 )
1
1
(1 )C
γ γρ
pi
+ + 
=  
− 
 and (1 2 )/(1 )2
1 ( )C R γ γθψ
pi
+ + 
=  
 
 
 
Keep in mind that per unit of income, (1-T)(1-e(1+τ)) is the savings after taxes and 
energy expenses; (T+τ(1-T)e), and (1-t)e is energy consumption. Also notice in (13) that if 
/(1 ) /(1 )( ) bR Rγ γ γ γρ θψ+ += , then nt is independent of fuel taxes and is only determined by the 
parameters of the model (i.e. nt = C1/(C1+C2)). 
       
Our most important results from equation (13): 
 
Result 1. Higher fuel taxes will cause the government to allocate a larger proportion of the tax 
revenues into the long-run investment. This can be seen from the following expression: 
        
2 2
/(1 ) /(1 )
2
1 2
?
(1 ) (1 )( ) ( (1 ) ) ( )
t
b
n T e T eR R
t T e C C
γ γ γ γρ θψ
τ τ
+ +
+
∂ − − −
 = − − ∂ + − +14444244443
14444244443
 .       (14) 
Equation (14) however needs to be further explained as it shows that the sign of the impact of 
fuel taxes,τ, on the government’s allocation of its tax revenues into the long-run investment, nt, 
might seem ambiguous (i.e., the sign of /(1 ) /(1 )( ) bR Rγ γ γ γρ θψ+ +−  is ambiguous). 
The government will increase its long-run investments when energy taxes increase (∂nt/∂τ 
>0) if /(1 ) /(1 )( ) bR Rγ γ γ γρ θψ+ +− < 0. This condition entails that: 
• ρ < R. The return on short-term investment is smaller than the return to long-run investment. 
This is important to give agents enough incentives to forgo early consumption; 
• Rb >1 which encourages agents to save or invest in the asset markets; 
• θ, the output elasticity of capital, is large enough; and/or 
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• pi, the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, is not extremely large.7 
 
Result 2. For given fuel tax rate, if ρ increases (i.e. return to the short-run investment), the 
government will allocate a larger proportion of every unit of tax collected into the long-run 
investment, that is, in infrastructure and in public goods. The effect is stronger if there are robust 
preferences for avoiding inequality between generations in excess of what follows from the 
discounting in the utility function (i.e. γ is large in absolute terms). To achieve higher welfare, it 
is then optimal for the government to invest more in other sectors of the economy, including 
infrastructure and public goods when the return to non-renewable energy increases. 
 
Result 3. For given fuel tax rate, too large increase in the return to long-run investment R, would 
not necessarily give more incentives to the government to make such investments. Thus, the 
government will not invest enough in infrastructure in spite of the higher returns. This can be 
viewed as a distortion as Jones (1998, 2013) described in the context of determining optimal 
research and development. Jones postulates that such type of distortion is a result of incomplete 
markets. In our case, there is a missing market for infrastructure and public goods which makes it 
difficult to identify the correct value (price) of the government’s long-term investments. As a 
result, the government will not respond strongly enough to higher R. 
 
It is now necessary to establish the conditions under which agents will have more 
incentives to forego consumption and become entrepreneurs. As we pointed out above, agents 
who withdraw at t+1 will consume r1twt = {(1-T)(1-e)wt + ρ (Twt + τ(1 – T)wtet)(1 – nt)/(1 – pi)}, 
while agents who become entrepreneurs will consume {(1-T)(1-e)wtRb + θψR(Twt + τ(1 – 
T)wtet)nt/pi). We find that agents with φ=1 will become entrepreneurs if the following condition 
holds: 
1(1 )(1 )(1 (1 )) ( (1 ) )
1
t t
b
n nT R e T T e Rτ τ θψ ρ
pi pi
− 
− − − + < + − − 
− 
;                (15a) 
or equivalently: 
                                                 
7
 Note that ψ = piθ-1. There should be a smaller allocation of the tax resources into long-run investment when fuel 
taxes rise and a larger number of agents are expected to become entrepreneurs. This should be optimal to avoid that 
decreasing returns to scale would be at work. 
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1( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ) (1 )(1 )(1 (1 ))
1
t t
b
n nT T e T T e R T R eτ ρ τ θψ τ
pi pi
−   
+ − < + − − − − − +   
−   
.      (15b) 
From (15) we obtain the following results: 
 
Result 4. The larger the returns on the government’s long-term investment, R, relatively to ρ, the 
greater the incentives to become entrepreneurs. There will be then sufficiently large return/gains 
on the government long-run investment in terms of reproducible capital. It is therefore crucial 
that the government translates tax revenues in its entirety into productive investment to succeed 
with its energy price reforms. 
 
In summary, equation (15) indicates that any fuel price reforms, through elimination of 
subsidies, will be successful and induce higher production if the government guarantees high 
rates of return on its public productive investments. Otherwise fewer agents will choose to 
become entrepreneurs and many more will seek to retire early. In the latter case, the government 
will need to invest most of its tax revenues in short-term projects to fund the pensions of early 
retirees. 
 
3.4 Equilibrium conditions 
    In equilibrium we have: 
       
2 2(1 )(1 (1 )) ( (1 ) )
( (1 ) )(1 )(1 (1 )) .
t t b t t t
t t t
t b
k T e w R r tw T w e
Rn Tw T w eT e w R
τ τ
τ
τ
pi
+ = − − + + + − =
+ −
− − + +
              (16) 
Equation (16) indicates that at equilibrium the average resource level (working capital plus 
financial assets) at t+2, 2tk + , depends on the returns on the government’s long-run investments, 
(R); how much of each unit of tax the government allocates into long-run investments such as 
infrastructure and public goods (nt); the probability that individuals will become entrepreneurs, 
pi; income taxes t; fuel taxes on energy consumption τ, the fraction of consumption that goes into 
energy consumption, e; the output elasticity of capital, θ; real wages (wt) and ultimately the 
return to entrepreneurs’ private savings, Rb. Particularly, note that at t+2, 2 ,tk + depends on taxes 
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(in addition to the other mentioned variables) paid at t which is reasonable since capital 
formation is assumed to take two periods.  
      Inserting (5) into (16) and dividing it by tk  yields: 
          
2 (1 ) (1 )(1 (1 )) ( (1 ) )t tb
t
k RnT e R t T e
k
θθ pi τ τ
pi
+  
= − − − + + + − 
 
.       (17) 
      Under our assumed production function (equation (3)), and taking into consideration the 
optimal levels of employment (equation (4)) and real wage (equation (5)) that clears the labor 
market, the output per firm at time t at equilibrium equals to ( (1 )) /t tk kδ θ θ ψ− − . Since the number of 
firms is constant over time, equation (17) also gives the equilibrium rate of growth of output.  
       Defining gt+2 as the rate of growth between t and t+2, if 2 /t tk k+ (= (1+gt+2)) is greater than 
one, the economy has positive growth (i.e. gt+2 is positive).  If 2 /t tk k+ is less than one, this 
economy is experiencing negative growth (i.e. gt+2 is negative). Thus, from equation (17), we can 
draw the following Result:  
 
Result 5. Ceteris paribus, an economy will experience economic growth ( 2 /t tk k+ > 1) if fuel 
taxes τ increases or if fuel subsidies are reduced (i.e. (T + (τ(1 – T)) increases)8. Note however 
that in a country that already enforces fuel taxes, setting these taxes at too high levels can cause a 
decline in savings (1 – T)(1 – e(1+τ)). Relative insufficient private savings or investment in 
assets can result in lower economic growth (lower positive gt+2).9 
 
The conclusion is that an economy cannot exclusively rely on public investment financed with 
tax revenues to attain positive growth. But high subsidies (-τ) on the other hand, will have a 
negative effect on growth because the government will not have enough funds to invest long-run 
investments (including public investment) in reproducible capital for the use of the 
                                                 
8
 τ becomes less negative. 
9
 An extreme but unlikely case will be one in which fuel taxes are extremely high that causes a negative growth (i.e. 
negative gt+2 yielding 2 /t tk k+ < 1).  
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entrepreneurs. In such circumstances, most agents will retire early and very few will become 
entrepreneurs.  
We now address the following question: how will a reduction in fuel subsidies or an increase 
in fuel taxes affect gt+2, for given initial levels of subsidies or taxes, respectively?  
 
We consider nt, as determined by (13). We note that the rate of return on savings (Rb) is 
smaller than the pledged return to the entrepreneurs for each unit of their tax paid to the 
government (r2t) to have incentives to become entrepreneur; and that tax revenues, (twt + τ(1 – 
T)wtet), are always positive. We obtain the following result: 
 
Result 6. For given parameter values, a reduction in fuel subsidies (i.e. a less negative τ) will 
increase the rate of economic growth. This effect on the growth rate will be greater the higher is 
the initial level of fuel subsidies. On the other hand, higher fuel taxes (i.e. a higher positive τ) 
will also raise the growth rate. It is nonetheless important to note that if the existing level of fuel 
taxes is already very high, the effect of higher fuel taxes on growth will be minimal. Thus, such 
an economy will experience decreasing returns as its fuel taxes, τ, start increasing and if its taxes 
are already too high. This result can be examined in the following expression:10 
2
/(1 ) /(1 )2
2
1 2
(1 (1 ) )(1 ) (1 ) ( ( ) ) ( (1 ) )( )
t
t bt
t b
k
k g R t e
t e R r R R
t t e C C
θ γ γ γ γθ pi ρ θψ
τ τ pi τ
+
+ ++
−
+
   ∂    ∂ − − 
= = − − − + − − ∂ ∂ + − + 
 
14444244443
144424443
 
                 (18) 
By taking the second derivative to (18), we can determine whether the equilibrium rate of 
growth of output, 2 /t tk k+ , is a concave or convex function with respect to fuel taxes, τ. Indeed, 
we find that this growth rate with respect to τ is concave: 
                   
( )2 2 22 /(1 ) /(1 )
2 2
1 2
(1 (1 ) )(1 )(1 ) ( ( ) ) 0( ) ( (1 ) ) ( )
t
b
g t e t eR R R
t t e C C
γ γ γ γθ ψ ρ θψ
τ τ
+ + +
−
+
∂
− − −
= − − <
∂ + − +14444244443
14444244443
      (19) 
This second derivative will be more negative, the smaller the fuel subsidies, τ, is. Results 5 and 6 
are illustrated in Figure 5.  
                                                 
10
 Keep in mind that r2t = Rnt/pi. 
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Figure 5 shows a concave curve G illustrating GDP growth as a function of the fuel retail 
price in a particular country. When a country has initially too low energy prices relative to 
certain fuel reference price such as P, as a result of energy subsidies or too low taxes (as for 
many MENA countries), our endogenous growth model predicts that the country will experience 
higher GDP growth as the energy price level rises (Result 6, equation (18)). Such effect is 
greater, the larger the initially level of subsidies. This would suggest moving from point L to 
point H on the curve for GDP growth (G).  
However, our model also predicts that if the country has already higher energy prices relative 
to some fuel reference price and continues increasing the fuel retail price, to for example P*, this 
country will face diminishing returns with respect to fuel taxes. This is probably the case of 
many ECA countries. The country will be moving to the right of H at U on curve G. This will 
occur because, according to the growth model, setting too high fuel taxes will induce a 
substantial decline in private savings and this economy will experience lower, or even negative 
rates of economic growth. To achieve economic growth, an economy should have an appropriate 
balance between public investment financed from tax revenues and private savings to avoid the 
diminishing returns to too high fuel taxes (Result 6, equation (17)). 
Figure 4 
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4. The Empirical Models: What does the data tell us about effects of energy subsidies 
on economic performance? 
This section contains the econometric models that helps to understand better the effect of 
energy prices on economic growth per capita and test our results of our theoretical model. Again, 
we test the following Hypothesis drawn from our theoretical model: 
Hypothesis: elimination of energy subsidies can have positive impacts on economic growth in 
countries that implement enduring energy price reforms by reducing fuel subsidies. 
Our empirical strategy consist of making an approximation to (17) and explicitly separate 
out the main effects from the interaction effects of interest. Our empirical work involves both 
cross-sectional and panel estimations: 
  
1. A cross-section approach to analyze long-run effects. We here study whether a reduction 
in subsidies (or increases in fuel price gaps) moves a country toward its optimal steady 
state potential for economic growth. All countries of all the World Bank Regions are 
analyzed, covering the periods i) from 1998 to 2012; and ii) two shorter time horizons, 
(1998 – 2004) and (2005 – 2012). This econometric approach requires that we obtain, for 
each country, the mean value of the relevant variables for each of the periods of study. 
2. A panel approach to study short- and medium-run effects. This analysis will quantify 
both the contemporaneous and the two-year-lagged effect of the fuel price gap on 
economic growth. The analysis here will be done by World Bank Region at the annual 
basis. Understanding the short-term impacts of fuel price reforms is also important 
because it is often how reforms affect the welfare of low income households in the first 
periods that determine their survival politically. 
 
These two approaches are therefore not only technically different, but each of them gives us 
different perspectives on the relationship between energy subsidies and economic growth.  
The analysis considers relationships between GDP per capita growth on one hand, and the 
price gap as defined by Koplow’s (2009). This gap is equal to fuel retail price minus the average 
U.S. retail price, minus 10 cents per liter for fuel importers (corresponding to the average U.S. 
tax), and minus an additional 10 cents per liter for fuel exporters. If the price gap is positive, 
there is a tax on this fuel; and a subsidy in the opposite case. 
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4.1 Cross-Sectional Modeling 
The cross-sectional approach uses the following simple empirical relation which represents our 
theoretical result represented by equation (17): 
2
1 1 1 1 ,1998( ) ( )per capita i c c i c i c i icGDP growth price gap price gap Iα β ϕ θ η= + + + +         (20a) 
GDP per capita growthi and (price gap)i are measured for each country i in ALL World Bank 
Regions from 1998 to 2012. ηic is the error term for the empirical equation (3a).  
GDP per capita growthi and (price gap)i (using the Koplow’s methodology) are the average 
for each country i in all World Bank Regions from 1998 to 2012. A sufficiently large increase in 
the price gap indicates that there are net taxes on energy, instead of subsidies. ηic is the error term 
for the empirical equation (1). Ii,1998 represents the initial income for each country in 1998, which 
serves to quantify the differences in the effect of subsidies on the economic growth across 
countries.  
One will fail to reject the main Hypothesis if β1c is positive and statistically significant in the 
empirical relationship (20a). The coefficient ϕ1c accompanying the square of the differences in 
prices is expected to be negative, in which case diminishing returns to increasing fuel prices will 
be at work. Such expected empirical results are also predicted by our endogenous growth model . 
That is, for a country whose energy prices are initially low, one should expect there to be much 
to gain in terms of additional growth by increasing energy prices. However, as an economy has 
fuel prices reaching higher levels, the gains in economic growth are reduced (Result 6).  
 
4.2 Panel Estimations Modeling 
This approach allows an analysis by Bank Region. Equation (3a) is modified as follows: 
 
1 1 2 1 3 2
2 2
1 2 1 1 ,1998
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
per capita it p p it p it p it
p it p it p i t i it
GDP growth price gap price gap price gap
price gap price gap I c
α β β β
ϕ ϕ θ τ η
− −
−
= + + +
+ + + + +
       (20b) 
 
GDP per capita growthit and (price gap)it are for each country i in each of the World Bank 
Regions at year t. Time and country fixed effects are denoted by τt and ci, respectively. ηit is the 
error term. Statistically positive and significant β2p and β3p indicate that a country will 
experience an increase in its current GDP per capita growth by β2p% and β3p% if it had pursued 
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fuel price reforms by increasing its fuel retail price by 1 cent relative to a specific fuel reference 
price (i.e. ∆price gap = 1 cent), during each of the past two years, respectively. There will be in 
addition a change of β1p% in the current GDP per capita growth if there is also an increase of 1 
cent in the current price gap. A negative β1p should not however lead to reject our underlying 
Hypothesis, if β2p and/or β3p are above all positive. Such result would only indicate that fuel 
price reforms do not have contemporaneous positive effects on output, but need to work their 
way through the economic system over time and it should not necessarily lead to a rejection of 
our underlying Hypothesis. 
On the other hand, a significant positive/negative ϕ1p and ϕ2p would indicate 
increasing/diminishing returns, in terms of growth, to increasing energy prices in the previous 
and current period. This is again also predicted by our theoretical model. 
Accordingly, one should expect the lagged effects (of the last past one- or two-year fuel price 
gaps), and the contemporaneous effects (of current fuel price gaps) on contemporaneous GDP 
growth, to differ. Increases in fuel retail prices today will likely increase fuel costs for enterprises 
which could lead to abrupt adjustments in their production, investment and employment, which 
can be manifested in an immediate reduction in growth, that is the same year the fuel subsidy 
reforms are implemented (with possible exceptions in cases where these fuel increases are 
compensated contemporaneously via increased money transfers to the public).  This will be 
echoed with a negative value of β1p. Nonetheless, with time, a country that puts in practice 
enduring fuel price reforms will likely encounter positive effects on its economy in the following 
periods. Such effect will be reflected in positive values of β2p and/or β3p. The GDP per capita in 
such reforming countries could start rising in the following periods via a number of different 
“pathways” stimulated by the lasting fuel price increases (lower budget deficits, larger social and 
infrastructure investment), while enterprises adjust their businesses to the new fuel pricing.  
 
4.3 Estimation Method 
We use the (robust) OLS estimation method for the cross-sectional data, and the System 
General Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998)) for the 
panel data. The GMM corrects for possible endogeneity and non-stationarity of the regressors or 
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explanatory variables. In particular, diesel and gasoline prices are most likely to be endogenous, 
being affected by both demand and supply conditions.  
The tables below report both the two-step estimates (which yield theoretically robust results, 
Roodman (2009)). Note also that by applying the two-step estimator, we can obtain the robust 
Sargan test (i.e. the robust Hansen J-test). This is important for testing the validity of the 
instruments (or overidentifying restrictions). The validity of the model depends also on testing 
the presence of first- and, in particular, second-order autocorrelation in the error term. These 
important statistical diagnostics are presented together with estimated parameters (De Hoyos and 
Sarafidis (2006). At the outset, it should be mentioned that all our empirical models, the Sargan 
tests of overidentifying restrictions do not reject the null hypothesis (e.g. of correct model 
specification and valid overidentifying restrictions) at any conventional level of significance; 
hence, it is an indication that the models have valid instruments. Our test results on 
autocorrelation indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis (e.g. the cross section 
dependence is homogeneous across pairs of cross section units after including time dummy 
variables). Hence, inclusion of time-dummies in our specification have removed universal time-
related shocks from the error term in our empirical models below. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
5.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis on the effect of energy subsidies on GDP per capita growth 
across all countries excluding High-Income OECD countries 
 
We here present the (robust) OLS estimates of equation (21a). Selected relevant estimates are 
displayed in Table 1. We consider the entire period; and the sub-periods 1998-2004 and 2005-
2012. The estimates for both the entire period and the sub-period 1998-2004 are mostly 
statistically insignificant. For the sub-period of 2005 to 2012 however, our estimates are all 
significant at reasonable statistical levels. They indicate that for a given level of average subsidy, 
a 20 cents average increase in the diesel and gasoline price per liter has caused an average 
increase in GDP per capita growth rates by about 0.28 percent and 0.46 percent, respectively.  
The results are interesting, and highly plausible. It is likely that during the period from 
2005 to 2012, which includes the years of global financial crisis from 2008 on; many countries 
have faced fiscal budget constraints that have been far more serious than in previous years. This 
2008 financial crisis situation has made it less affordable for them to finance energy subsidies; 
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and has resulted in greater damage in terms of reduced economic growth from energy subsidies. 
Thus, a decrease in subsidies must have helped to achieve increased rates of economic growth 
over this period. This would also appear much less likely to have been the case before 2005. 
Table 1: Cross-Sectional Analysis: GDP per capita growth (%) and Koplow’s fuel price 
gap (US$ cents per liter)a. All countries except OECD. 1998-2012. OLS robust estimatesb 
Effect on GDP per capita growth 
1998-2012 
RHS Variables Gasoline Price Diesel Price 
Koplow’s fuel price gap 0.00948 
(0.0108) 
0.00297 
(0.0091) 
(Koplow’s fuel price gap)2 -0.00020* 
(0.00011) 
-0.00019 
(0.00013) 
1998-2004 
RHS Variables Gasoline Price Diesel Price 
Koplow’s fuel price gap) 0.02982 
(0.03561) 
0.0159 
(0.0287) 
(Koplow’s fuel price gap)2 -0.00088 
(0.00062) 
-0.00078 
(0.00064) 
2005-2012 
RHS Variables Gasoline Price Diesel Price 
Koplow’s fuel price gap 0.02316*** 
(0.0090) 
0.01374* 
(0.0079) 
(Koplow’s fuel price gap)2 -0.00022*** 
(0.00008) 
-0.00026* 
(0.00014) 
a
 A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Error terms in parentheses. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
 
In MENA, most countries subsidize gasoline; while in ECA, most countries tax it, as shown 
in Figures 1 and 2. Consider simple correlations for 1998 - 2012 between the average of the 
gasoline Koplow’s price gap, and the average GDP per capita growth for these two Regions. We 
notice, from Figures 5 and 6, that low fuel price gaps (high energy subsidies) in the countries in 
the MENA Region have, on the whole, been harmful to economic growth over this period. The 
opposite is the case for the countries in the ECA Region (excluding the OECD countries). 
MENA and ECA Regions are representative of two opposing sets of policies. 
From observing these contrasting facts, it becomes obvious that one needs to analyze these 
patterns by Region, and quantify the impact of fuel prices on the economic growth on the 
Regional basis. Such differentiation cannot be done by using the Cross-Sectional Approach. 
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Figure 5. Correlation between GDP per capita growth and    Figure 6. Correlation between GDP per capita growth and 
   Gasoline Price Gap: Subsidies (-) Taxes (+) ($ cents/liter)       Gasoline Price Gap: Subsidies (-) Taxes (+) ($ cents/liter) 
 
     
    
 
5.2 Panel Country Analysis of effects of energy subsidies on GDP per capita growth per 
World Bank Region 
 
We have constructed a panel dataset of countries by each World Bank Region to estimate 
equation (20b) and test the underlying hypothesis.  
Tables 2 and 3 show the empirical results of the effect of countries’ diesel and gasoline price 
policies on growth, respectively. We consider the countries in the MENA, LAC, ECA, EAP and 
AFR World Bank regions, but also the OECD group. For the ECA, LAC and EAP regions these 
tables have two separate columns. For ECA there are additional columns for calculations where 
four “subsidy countries” (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are removed; 
for LAC we add a separate set of columns for results when 4 “energy subsidy” countries 
(Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela) are excluded; and for EAP there are additional 
columns showing estimations where five high-income countries (Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, 
New Zealand and Singapore) are not part of the estimation since these are high-income 
countries.  
One should recognize that increases in fuel retail prices today will likely increase fuel costs 
for enterprises which could lead to abrupt short-run adjustments in their production, investment 
and employment. This can be manifested in a reduction in growth in the same year that fuel 
subsidy reforms are implemented. This will be echoed with a negative value of β1p in equation 
(20b).
 
Nonetheless, any fuel price reform made today will be beneficial in the subsequent 
periods. The GDP per capita in reforming countries could start rising in the following periods via 
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a number of different “pathways” stimulated by the positive effects that these reforms have on 
government budget and social and infrastructure investment. In the meantime, enterprises 
gradually adjust their businesses to the more “correct” and new fuel price levels and their 
positive effects on its economy in the following periods. Such effect will be reflected in positive 
values of β2p and/or β3p from equation (20b). 
Indeed, the estimated parameters β2p and β3p (parameters of the RHS variables (price gap)t-1 
and (price gap)t-2, respectively) in equation (20b) are statistically significant and positive. These 
results then indicate that the benefits of decreasing fuel (diesel or gasoline) subsidies today will 
be noticed in each of the next couple of years, respectively. Thus, a subsidy reduction in t-1 or t-
2 will cause an increase in GDP per capita growth in period t in all World Bank Regions except 
in countries of the ECA Region and OECD for both diesel and gasoline, and the LAC and AFR 
Regions for gasoline.  
Note that the GDP per capita growth in countries of certain Regions could rise concurrently 
(i.e. at t) with reductions in fuel subsidies (also at t). This would be the case when β1p (which 
accompanies the RHS variable (price gap)t) is positive and statistically significant. This is 
especially notable for MENA (only diesel), LAC, and AFR. It is however found that only 
countries in the EAP Regions (and ECA and OECD) might need to cope with contemporaneous 
(i.e. at t) reductions in their GDP per capita growth in response to increases in domestic retail 
diesel price (i.e. also occurring at t). 
A significant positive (negative) ϕ1p and ϕ2p (parameters accompanying the square of the fuel 
price gaps at t and t-1, respectively) would indicate increasing (diminishing) returns, in terms of 
growth, to increasing energy prices not only in the same year when the fuel price reform took 
place, but also in the subsequent year. This is the case of countries in most Regions: they face 
diminishing returns in terms of growth as they increase their fuel prices. This result corresponds 
to the reasoning behind the inverted U-form curve G in Figure 5 and our endogenous growth 
model. 
Referring again to Figure 5, one can say that most of the countries in all World Bank Regions 
seem to be on the left-rising (upward-sloping) part of the curve G in section 2 above. 
Interestingly, for the ECA Region (and OECD countries) results are directly opposite in response 
to increases in these countries’ fuel prices, which indicates that lower fuel prices and taxes 
would, in general, lead to higher economic growth in this particular region. 
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Table 2: GDP per capita growth (%) and Koplow’s diesel price gap (US$ cents per liter)a. 1998-2012b. System GMM 
Effect on GDP per capita growth (%) 
RHS 
Variable  
MENA LAC LAC 
(minus 4 
countries) 
EAP EAP 
(minus 5 
HIC) 
AFR ECA ECA 
(minus 4 
countries) 
OECD 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap1t 
0.0462** 
(0.0222) 
0.0298 
(0.0234) 
0.0875*** 
(0.0344) 
-0.0186 
(0.0492) 
-0.1770*** 
(0.0659) 
0.0559*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0603*** 
(0.0063) 
-0.1055*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.1311*** 
(0.0055) 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap1t-1 
-0.0612*** 
(0.0216) 
-0.0231 
(0.0149) 
0.0725** 
(0.0320) 
0.0266 
(0.0951) 
0.2039*** 
(0.0754) 
0.0121*** 
(0.0034) 
-0.0465*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.0163*** 
(0.0048) 
-0.0664*** 
(0.0088) 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap1t-2 
0.0164* 
(0.0098) 
0.0254*** 
(0.0090) 
0.0255*** 
(0.0079) 
0.0509*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0456*** 
(0.0124) 
0.00073 
(0.0033) 
-0.0216*** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0307*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0089 
(0.0029 
(Diesel 
Price 
Gap1)2t 
-0.00037*** 
(0.00015) 
0.00020 
(0.00023) 
-0.00040 
(0.00032) 
0.00025 
(0.00039) 
0.0013*** 
(0.00046) 
-0.00030*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00055***  
(0.000357) 
0.00112*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00104*** 
(0.000033) 
(Diesel 
Price 
Gap1)2t-1 
0.00078*** 
(0.00016) 
-0.00046*** 
(0.00013) 
-0.00131*** 
(0.00038) 
-0.00078 
(0.00074) 
-0.0025*** 
(0.00065)  
0.00013*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.00015** 
(0.000073) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.00005) 
-0.00097*** 
(0.000050) 
AR(1) 
testc 
z = -1.115 
Pr>z=0.265 
z = -2.179 
Pr>z=0.029 
z = -1.913 
Pr>z=0.056 
z = -2.9804 
Pr>z=0.003 
z = -1.7856 
Pr>z=0.074 
z = -3.622 
Pr>z=0.000 
z = -3.228 
Pr>z=0.001 
z = -2.3035 
Pr>z=0.021 
z = -3.454 
Pr>z=0.006 
AR(2) 
testc 
z = 0.282 
Pr>z=0.778 
z = -0.1805 
Pr>z=0.857 
z = 0.485 
Pr>z=0.628 
z = -0.804 
Pr>z=0.422 
z = 1.504 
Pr>z=0.133 
z = -0.556 
Pr>z=0.578 
z = -3.032 
Pr>z=0.002 
z = -0.491 
Pr>z=0.624 
z = -0.158 
Pr>z=0.875 
Sargan 
testd 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.99 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.97 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.95 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.99 
Prob>chi2 
= 1.00 
Prob>chi2 
= 1.00 
Prob>chi2 
= 1.00 
Prob>chi2 
= 1.00 
Prob>chi2 
= 1.00 
a
 A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level 
c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions
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Table 3: GDP per capita growth (%) and Koplow’s gasoline price gap (US$ cents per liter)a. 1998-2012b. 
Effect on GDP per capita growth (%) 
Variable  MENA LAC LAC 
(minus 4 
countries) 
EAP EAP 
(minus 5 
HICs) 
AFR ECA ECA 
(minus 3 
countries) 
OECD 
Gasoline 
Price Gap2t 
 0.0193 
(0.0196) 
0.0488** 
(0.0218) 
0.0948*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.0167 
(0.0508) 
0.0055 
(0.0264) 
0.0454*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.00467 
(0.0210) 
-0.00201 
(0.02071) 
-0.07283*** 
(0.00989) 
Gasoline 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
-0.0993*** 
(0.0244) 
-0.0103 
(0.0129) 
0.0460* 
(0.0286) 
-0.0048 
(0.0383) 
0.0721 
(0.0935) 
0.0210*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0724*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.08171*** 
(0.00438) 
-0.04176*** 
(0.00493) 
Gasoline 
Price 
Gap2t-2 
0.0653*** 
(0.0180) 
-0.0122* 
(0.0070) 
-0.0062 
(0.0078) 
0.0571*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0533*** 
(0.0096) 
-0.00059 
(0.00124) 
-0.0343*** 
(0.00081) 
-0.02264*** 
(0.00234) 
-0.03690*** 
(0.00219) 
(Gasoline 
Price 
Gap2)2t 
-0.000756 
(0.000207) 
 0.00003 
(0.00018) 
-0.00047* 
(0.00028) 
0.000024 
(0.00022) 
-0.00016*  
(0.000097) 
-0.00024*** 
(0.00003)) 
0.00013*** 
(0.00005) 
0.000074 
(0.000062) 
0.00042*** 
(0.000055) 
(Gasoline 
Price 
Gap1)2t-1 
0.00120*** 
(0.00025) 
-0.00047*** 
(0.00013) 
-0.00084*** 
(0.00018) 
-0.00038** 
(0.00019) 
-0.00076 
(0.00050) 
-0.00011*** 
(0.00001) 
0.00024*** 
(0.000037) 
0.000265*** 
(0.000027) 
0.000199*** 
(0.000024) 
AR(1) testc z = -1.123 
Pr>z=0.262 
z = -2.351 
Pr>z=0.019 
z = -2.023 
Pr>z=0.043 
z = -2.815 
Pr>z=0.005 
z = -2.175 
Pr>z=0.030 
z = -3.737 
Pr>z=0.000 
z = -2.565 
Pr>z=0.010 
z = -2.965 
Pr>z=0.003 
z = -2.679 
Pr>z=0.007 
AR(2) testc z = -0.622 
Pr>z=0.530 
z = -1.007 
Pr>z=0.314 
z = -0.1815 
Pr>z=0.856 
z = -1.541 
Pr>z=0.123 
z = -1.019 
Pr>z=0.308 
z = -0.5889 
Pr>z=0.556 
z = -3.063 
Pr>z=0.002 
z = -2.802 
Pr>z=0.005 
z = -1.146 
Pr>z=0.252 
Sargan 
testd 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.99 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.98 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.99 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.99 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.97 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.99 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.99 
Prob>chi2 
= 0.95 
Prob>chi2 = 
0.96 
a
 A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
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6. Will reductions in diesel subsidies decrease employment in the MENA and ECA 
Regions? 
The analysis of the effect of a reduction in diesel subsidies on employment, and labor 
participation of youth aged 15 to 24, and on labor participation of the populations aged from 15 
to 65 (all of them measured with respect to the total populations aged above 15 years old) is 
important. We estimate a similar equation (20b), except that we have the employment variables 
on the left-hand side. The effect is particularly strong for the case of diesel subsidies. The results 
are shown in Tables 4 for MENA and ECA countries, for comparison purposes. Much more 
significant positive effects of subsidy reductions on employment and participation in the labor 
force are found for MENA than for the ECA countries, even when it happens with some delay.11  
Table 4. MENA and ECA Regions: Employment, Labor Force Participation and Koplow’s 
diesel price gap (US$ cents per liter)a. 1998-2012.b System GMM. 
Effect on Total 
Employment/Population, age 15+ (%) 
Effect on Labor Force Participation 
ages 15 to 24/Population, age 15+ (%) 
Effect on Labor Force Participation 
ages 15 to 65/Population, age 15+ (%) 
MENA 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price  
Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price  
Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price  
Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
0.01589 
(0.03294) 
0.09256*** 
(0.03981) 
-0.03372 
(0.02048) 
-0.01961** 
(0.00914) 
0.03450*** 
(0.00562) 
0.00874*** 
(0.00197) 
-0.0326*** 
(0.00692) 
0.0515*** 
(0.00774) 
0.00089 
(0.00581) 
AR(1) testc: z=0.0169; Pr>z=0.9865 AR(1) testc: z=1.3305; Pr>z=0.1834    AR(1) testc: z=0.328; Pr>z=0.743 
   AR(2) testc: z=1.5647; Pr>z=0.1177    AR(2) testc: z=1.1187; Pr>z=0.2633 AR(2) testc: z=1.1519; Pr>z=0.2494 
   Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00    Sargan testd Pr > chi2 = 1.00   Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
ECA 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price 
 Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
Diesel 
Price  
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price  
Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
-0.0568*** 
(0.00139) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.00091) 
0.0109*** 
(0.00072) 
-0.0381*** 
(0.00681) 
-0.0314*** 
(0.00463) 
-0.0049*** 
(0.00222) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.00162) 
-0.0232*** 
(0.00210) 
0.0061*** 
(0.00096) 
AR(1) testc: z=-0.9002; Pr>z=0.3680 AR(1) testc: z=0.2246; Pr>z=0.8223 AR(1) testc: z=2.0839; Pr>z=0.0372 
  AR(2) testc: z=-0.7057; Pr>z=0.4804    AR(2) testc: z=1.8578; Pr>z=0.0632    AR(2) testc: z=0.0589; Pr>z=0.9530 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses.***Significant at 1% level;**significant at 5% level;*significant at 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are 
respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
                                                 
11
 Not significant, statistically and numerically, effects were found when considering gasoline subsidies. 
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It should be noted that an effect of raising diesel taxes might reduce labor participation in the 
very short run (as subsidies are removed), including the youth population aged 15 to 24 in the 
MENA countries. But as the entire economy adjust and reallocates resources to less-capital and 
less-energy intensive sectors in response to the new energy prices, and with the help of better 
infrastructure and better supply of public services (which is what we find and presented below), 
labor market participation and employment will increase in subsequent years. For example, a 20 
cents increase in diesel retail price for two consecutive periods could increase employment as a 
percentage of working population above 15 years old by 2.2%; and youth participation as a 
percentage also of working population above 15 years old by 0.86%. 
A recent World Bank (2014) report emphasizes that energy subsidies encourage energy-
intensive production, which also tends to be capital-intensive, and discourages labor 
employment. If the MENA countries substantially reduce their levels of energy subsidies, their 
levels of employment will increase, in particular among the young. 
 
7. Will savings from reducing fuel subsidy expenditures be relocated to productive public 
investment and spur economic growth? 
As Figure 3 above indicates, a disproportionate amount of resources are used to finance 
subsidies in the MENA Region relative to those used in public investment. It is of relevance to 
learn whether any savings in fuel subsidies made by the MENA Countries have been (and could 
be) redirected toward more productive public investment. On the other hand, to assess whether or 
not fiscal budgets improve in response to reduced fuel subsidies in the MENA countries, we need 
to determine how government investment in public goods such as health, education and 
infrastructure, respond to reductions in fuel subsidies.  
Due to data restrictions, the focus here is only on infrastructure, health and education. For 
comparison purposes, the analysis also include the countries in the ECA Region.  
Figures 7 and 8 show a positive correlation between the fuel price gap and health 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the MENA countries.  
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Figure 7. Correlation of Health Expenditures/GDP and         Figure 8. Correlation of Health Expenditures/GDP and 
   Gasoline Price Gap: Subsidies (-) Taxes (+) ($cents/liter)         Diesel Price Gap: Subsidies (-) Taxes (+) ($cents/liter) 
 
  
 
The figures give a strong indication that these countries redirect at least part of their 
subsidy savings to health. This is also shown empirically. We estimate the following 
relationship: 
           1 2 1 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it it it it t i itX a b price gap b price gap b price gap cτ ξ− −= + + + + + +       (21) 
Xit is a matrix containing variables related to Education, Health, and Infrastructure for each 
country at time t. The other explanatory variables have been defined above. ξit is the error term.  
Due to availability of data, we only consider public education expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP; and the ratio of the number of students enrolled to pursue a tertiary 
education as a proportion of the population of the same age group that officially corresponds to 
the level of education; infrastructure expenditures relative to GDP; the percentages of rural 
populations that have access to water; and the percentage of rural population that have access to 
sanitation.  
Much of the government savings due to reduced gasoline and diesel subsidies have been 
used to increase spending in health in the MENA countries. An increase in the price of diesel or 
gasoline of 20 cents per liter for two consecutive years can lead to an increase in health 
expenditures of 0.24 percent of GDP. See Table 5. 
It is however evident from Table 5 that subsidy savings have not been enough to sustain 
higher health expenditures for long periods into the future. This is also confirmed by Figure 5. 
The governments might need other funding sources as well as a longer-lasting reduction in fuel 
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subsidies to sustain permanent increases in health expenditure. This is reasonable since 
adjustments in the personnel and infrastructure would need continuously more funding to have a 
positive impact on the health sector. For comparison purposes, we also present the empirical 
results for the ECA countries which indicate that these countries consistently use their fuel tax 
revenues to maintain higher health expenditures over longer periods of time. 
Table 5. MENA and ECA Regions: Health Expenditures and Koplow’s fuel price gap (US$ 
cents per liter)a. 1998 – 2012.b System GMM. 
Effect on Health Expenditures/GDP (%) 
MENA - Diesel 
Diesel Price Gapt Diesel Price Gapt-1 Diesel Price Gapt-2 
0.00946*** 
(0.00167) 
0.00254* 
(0.00147) 
-0.00189 
(0.00196) 
AR(1) testc: z=-0.7538; Pr>z=0.4510; AR(2) testc: z=0.7794; Pr>z=0.4357 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
ECA - Diesel 
Diesel Price Gapt Diesel Price Gapt-1 Diesel Price Gapt-2 
0.00898*** 
(0.00152) 
0.00737* 
(0.00460) 
0.00460*** 
(0.00097) 
AR(1) testc: z=0.6709; Pr>z=0.5023; AR(2) testc: z=-0.0962; Pr>z=0.9234 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
MENA - Gasoline 
Gasoline Price Gapt Gasoline Price Gapt-1 Gasoline Price Gapt-2 
0.00092 
(0.00232) 
0.00968*** 
(0.00099) 
0.00245** 
(0.00114) 
 AR(1) testc: z=-0.6355; Pr>z=0.5251;  AR(2) testc: z=-1.8511; Pr>z=0.0642 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
ECA - Gasoline 
Gasoline Price Gapt Gasoline Price Gapt-1 Gasoline Price Gapt-2 
0.00627*** 
(0.00043) 
0.00615*** 
(0.00034) 
0.00242** 
(0.00015) 
AR(1) testc: z=0.2794; Pr>z=0.7799; AR(2) testc: z=-0.5392; Pr>z=0.5897 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are 
respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
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Investments in infrastructure have been delayed from the time the governments obtain 
savings from reduced diesel subsidies. This can be seen from Table 6.12 We find that in the 
MENA countries, it takes at least one year to observe a positive and statistically significant 
reallocating of subsidy savings toward infrastructure investments. This is much in contrast to the 
ECA countries, which seem to not only immediately redirect a larger proportion of their fuel 
taxes to infrastructure investments, but also allocate more permanent such taxes into future 
investments.  
Table 6. MENA and ECA Regions: Infrastructure Investment and Koplow’s diesel price 
gap (US$ cents per liter)a. 1998 – 2012b 
 
Effect on Public Infrastructure/GDP Effect on % Rural Population with 
improved water access 
Effect on % Rural Population with 
improved sanitation access 
MENA 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-2 
-0.0201** 
(0.00865) 
0.01602* 
(0.00919) 
-0.0595*** 
(0.00704) 
0.02748*** 
(0.00787) 
-0.01771 
(0.01825) 
-0.02402 
(0.01609) 
-0.0461*** 
(0.00565) 
0.01840*** 
(0.00356) 
-0.0867*** 
(0.0067) 
AR(1) testc: z=-1.0994; Pr>z=0.2716 AR(1) testc: z=1.5031; Pr>z=0.1328 AR(1) testc: z=0.9885; Pr>z=0.3229 
  AR(2) testc: z=-0.7954; Pr>z=0.4264    AR(2) testc: z=1.3522; Pr>z=0.1763     AR(2) testc: z=2.6115; Pr>z=0.009 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 Sargan testd: H0: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
ECA 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-2 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel 
Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-2 
0.01307** 
(0.00624) 
-0.00295 
(0.00569) 
0.01044*** 
(0.00375) 
0.06947*** 
(0.01480) 
0.03503*** 
(0.00478) 
0.03777*** 
(0.00517) 
0.06197*** 
(0.00316) 
0.03019*** 
(0.00208) 
0.01579*** 
(0.00286) 
AR(1) testc: z=-1.7701; Pr>z=0.0767 AR(1) testc: z=2.4226; Pr>z=0.0154 AR(1) testc: z=0.281; Pr>z=0.437 
AR(2) testc: z=-1.0064; Pr>z=0.3142 AR(2) testc: z=-2.4377; Pr>z=0.0148 AR(2) testc: z=0.519; Pr>z=0.6494 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 Sargan testd:  Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are 
respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
 
                                                 
12
 The data on infrastructure comes from the IMF which was used in their World Economic Outlook (IMF (2014a)). 
The source for data on employment comes from the International Labor Organization while the data for Health 
Expenditures, Water and Sanitation Access comes from the World Development Indicators. 
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Raising diesel taxes or eliminating diesel subsidies have improved access to water and 
sanitation among rural populations in the MENA countries.13 Today’s savings of about 20 cents 
per liter on diesel subsidies can facilitate i) an immediate up-front investments to facilitate an 
additional 0.55 percent access to water in the rural sector; and a year later ii) another 0.37 
percent of the rural population will experience a greater access to sanitation facilities and iii) an 
increase in infrastructure spending of 0.32 percent of GDP. 
Nevertheless, today’s diesel subsidy savings are not enough to continue building up the 
infrastructure stock over longer periods of time. See Table 7.  Today’s savings are not enough to 
finance infrastructure spending beyond two years. The estimated coefficients, b2 and/or b3 in 
equation (21) are not significant and may even be negative. The MENA countries need to make 
the reductions in fuel subsidies substantial and permanent to obtain more steady revenues.  
The countries in the ECA Region seem to have contrasting practices. They benefit more 
from their more persistent fuel tax policies practices. These allow them to experience more long-
term positive effects and boosting their aggregate demand through the short-run fiscal multiplier, 
crowding in private investment and benefitting from the highly complementary nature of 
infrastructure services. 
Table 7 shows how savings in diesel subsidies can be redirected toward education 
expenditures. For instance, today’s education spending will increase around 0.27 percent of GDP 
if a government saves today 20 cents per liter in diesel subsidies. However, savings from 
reducing or eliminating fuel subsidies in a specific year t only serve to finance education 
expenditures the same concurrent year and not beyond that year. For the ECA countries in 
contrast, the same amount of forgone subsidies are used for at least three consecutive future 
years to finance public education.  
With regard to enrollment in tertiary education, there will be more incentives to pursue 
higher education in response to higher fuel prices in countries of both Regions. The enrollment 
increases by about 2.8 percent in response to a 20 cents increase in retail diesel price. Thus, 
higher fuel prices might make individuals aware that they need more education to i) increase 
their likelihood to participate in the labor force and be able to finance their fuel consumption; 
                                                 
13
 We have also considered urban populations and the results are available upon request. 
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and/or ii) respond to a demand for specific skilled labor as their countries’ production structure 
changes in response to reduced subsidies. Note also here the contrasting situation between the 
MENA and ECA countries. 
 
Table 7. MENA and ECA Regions: Education Expenditures and Koplow’s diesel price gap 
(US$ cents per liter)a. 1998 – 2012.b System GMM. 
Effect on Education Expenditures/GDP (%) Effect on Enrollment in Tertiary Education/Population of 
same age (%) 
MENA 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-2 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-2 
0.00957*** 
(0.00244) 
-0.00279 
(0.00242) 
-0.00629*** 
(0.00282) 
0.05864*** 
(0.01219) 
0.08343*** 
(0.01615) 
-0.11354 
(0.01359) 
AR(1) testc: z=0.90325; Pr>z=0.3664                              
AR(2) testc: z=0.4564; Pr>z=0.6481 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
AR(1) testc: z=0.652; Pr>z=0.4241                              
AR(2) testc: z=0.581; Pr>z=0.6624 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
ECA 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-2 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-1 
Diesel Price 
Gap2t-2 
0.00681*** 
(0.00272) 
0.01089*** 
(0.00318) 
0.01365*** 
(0.00212) 
0.10415*** 
(0.00975) 
0.09673*** 
(0.00973) 
0.09409*** 
(0.00958) 
AR(1) testc: z=-0.535; Pr>z=0.651                              
AR(2) testc: z=-1.3511; Pr>z=0.342 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
AR(1) testc: z=-0.3823; Pr>z=0.2531 
AR(2) testc: z=-1.011; Pr>z=0.2542 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are 
respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
 
 
7. Will reductions in fuel price subsidies ameliorate government budget balance? 
There is a general perspective that fuel subsidies could cause government budget deficits. A 
reduction or elimination in subsidies should then reduce deficits, unless the government uses the 
entire savings from subsidies on productive public investments, or to grant cash transfers to the 
public to compensate them for any loss in welfare caused by higher fuel prices.  
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Table 8 displays estimated effects of fuel subsidy reductions (or fuel tax increases) on the 
government budget balance as a percentage of total GDP (GBB) for the MENA countries. The 
relation we estimate is the following: 
1 2 1
3 2
( / ) ( ) ( )
( )
it it it
it t i it
Government Budget Balance GDP a b price gap b price gap
b price gap cτ µ
−
−
= + + +
+ + +
       (22) 
 
The explanatory variables have been defined above. µit is the error term.  
 
The estimates indicate that a reduction in fuel subsidies does not immediately improve 
the GBB. Such improvement only occurs gradually. This result is reasonable because, as 
documented above, savings in fuel subsidies seem to have served to increase spending in health, 
education and infrastructure in the first year or first two years after the fuel price reform. Thus, a 
subsidy reduction in diesel and gasoline of 20 cents per liter would ameliorate the GBB by 1.57 
percent and 1.16 percent, respectively but with a delay of two years. 
Table 8. MENA: Government Budget Balance/GDP (GBB) and Koplow’s fuel price gap 
(US$ cents per liter)a. 1998 – 2012.b System GMM. 
 
Effect on GBB (%) 
Diesel Price Gapt Diesel Price Gapt-1 Diesel Price Gapt-2 
-0.07123*** 
(0.02820) 
-0.05789 
(0.03559) 
0.07841*** 
(0.02928) 
AR(1) testc: z=0.925; Pr>z=0.664 ; AR(2) testc: z=0.564; Pr>z=0.484 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
Gasoline Price Gapt Gasoline Price Gapt-1 Gasoline Price Gapt-2 
-0.02018 
(0.02678) 
 -0.13177*** 
(0.03005) 
0.05832** 
(0.03069) 
AR(1) testc: z=0.3725; Pr>z=0.452 ; AR(2) testc: z=0.157; Pr>z=0.214 
Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are 
respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
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8. The channels by which fuel price reforms stimulate economic growth in MENA 
countries 
We have demonstrated that i) a reduction in subsidies is likely to spur economic growth; and ii) 
in MENA region countries a fraction of government savings from reduced energy subsidies are 
redirected toward public expenditures such as health, education and infrastructure. The obvious 
next step is to explore and disentangle whether each of these types of public investments are 
channels by which energy subsidies affect economic growth in this region.  
Education expenditures is a main contributor to explaining economic growth, from relevant 
economic literature.14 Table 9 presents the interaction between education, fuel subsidies 
(Koplow’s fuel price gap) and economic growth. From this analysis we will also learn if the fuel 
subsidies – economic growth relationship is robust to the alternative we here propose. 
 
The following empirical relationship is estimated using a panel analysis: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 , 1 , 2 , 1 3 , 2
2 2
1 , 2 , 1 1 2 31 2
1 , ,1998
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
per capita it p x p x it p x it p x it
p x it p x it it it it
p x i t i it
GDP growth price gap price gap price gap
price gap price gap X X X
I c
α β β β
ϕ ϕ γ γ γ
θ τ ζ
− −
−
− −
= + + +
+ + + +
+ + +
           
     (23) 
 
Xi is a vector contains the Education Spending/GDP, for each country i at time, t, t-1 and t-2. The 
other explanatory variables have been defined above. ζit is the error term. These variable 
education enters with lags to take into account that they represent long-term public investment, 
and that it normally takes time for changes in these variables to have an effect on GDP. 
The results indicate that it takes time for increases in education expenditures relative to GDP 
to have an impact on GDP per capita growth. A 1 percent increase today in education spending 
as a percentage of GDP would increase GDP per capita growth by at least 2% in the following 
year. It might look a relatively high effect but note however that the levels of education 
expenditures are so low in the MENA countries, as reported by the IMF (2014b) that it should 
not take much to have a large impact on GDP once education spending start rising.  
                                                 
14
 See Jones (1997), Aghion and Howitt (1999), and Jones and Vollrath (2013). 
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The other important result is to notice that now there are no effects of diesel and gasoline 
subsidies on GDP per capita in our new specification. That indicates that any effect that a 
reduction in subsidies can have on GDP per capita must has occurred through increases in the 
different public investments, especially in education. 
 
Table 9. MENA: GDP per capita Growth (%); Koplow’s diesel price gap (US$ cents per 
liter); and Educationa. 1998 – 2012.b System GMM.  
a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. 
b Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level 
c
 These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H0) are 
respectively: 
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
• There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
d
 With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions 
 
9. Conclusions 
To fully understand why and how a country can gain from eliminating fuel subsidies, it requires 
a thorough analysis involving various fields including economics, politics, and life sciences, to 
mention just a few, as well as a deep understanding of human behavior and the government’s 
role in the lives of its citizens.  
Our objective and approach have been here more modest, and has aimed to promote an 
awareness of potential benefits of phasing out fuel subsidies. This paper has studied the 
Effect on GDP per capita growth (%) 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-1 
Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-2 
(Diesel 
Price 
Gapt)2 
(Diesel 
Price 
Gapt-1)2 
(Education 
Expenditures/
GDP)t (%) 
(Education 
Expenditures/
GDP)t-1 (%) 
(Education 
Expenditures/
GDP)t-2 (%) 
0.00218 
(0.04276) 
-0.06518 
(0.0991) 
0.02113 
(0.04037) 
0.00104 
(0.00067) 
-0.00076 
(0.00112) 
0.39254 
(0.84168) 
2.11043* 
(1.2114) 
0.00064 
(0.56807) 
AR(1) testc: z=-1.9479; Pr>z=0.0514;  AR(1) testc: z=0.6759; Pr>z=0.4991 
           Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
Gasoline 
Price 
Gapt 
Gasoline 
Price 
Gapt-1 
Gasoline 
Price 
Gapt-2 
(Gasoline 
Price 
Gapt)2 
(Gasoline 
Price 
Gapt-1)2 
(Education 
Expenditures/
GDP)t (%) 
(Education 
Expenditures/
GDP)t-1 (%) 
(Education 
Expenditures/
GDP)t-2 (%) 
0.00348 
(0.02962) 
-0.0378 
(0.0391) 
0.02971 
(0.04500) 
0.00087*** 
(0.00079) 
0.000070 
(0.00045) 
0.15781 
(0.52794) 
2.18655*** 
(0.84436) 
0.50624 
(0.59324) 
AR(1) testc: z=-1.6855; Pr>z=0.0919;  AR(1) testc: z=0.5955; Pr>z=0.5515 
                 Sargan testd: Pr > chi2 = 1.00 
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relationships between fuel pricing and economic growth, and mechanisms by which removing 
fuel subsidies or imposing fuel taxes can spur growth. 
One of the purposes of this paper has been to study relationships between fuel pricing and 
economic growth, and to investigate the mechanisms by which the removal of fuel subsidies, or 
imposing fuel taxes, can spur growth. We first present a theoretical analysis in which young 
agents derive their incomes from supplying labor, and pay income and fuel taxes. The 
government can invest such fuel tax revenues in short-term projects, or in long-term productive 
projects in productive capital (including infrastructure) and generate positive externalities. When 
agents become middle-aged, a certain proportion of them will choose to spend their net income 
right away, and retire early from the labor force and collect their pensions which is financed with 
the government’s short-term investments. The rest of the individuals prefer to become 
entrepreneurs and use the productive capital stock derived from the government’s investments. 
We first demonstrate that higher economic growth is possible if government revenues from 
reduced fuel subsidies, or increased fuel taxes, are used less in short-term investment, and more 
for long-term investments (e.g. in public goods, infrastructure, producible capital) that yield high 
returns. Such a type of decisions give agents incentives to become entrepreneurs and be 
productive instead of retiring early and become just consumers. At least two important lessons 
can be drawn from our model. First, we have identified a plausible mechanism by which higher 
fuel subsidies will lead to lower economic growth. Second, it is important that the government 
spends its revenues from increasing fuel taxes to expand the economy’s productive capital (e.g. 
infrastructure. This is a useful result that can serve as a basis for guidelines to governments. 
We then go on to empirically test our hypothesis, derived from our theoretical model. This 
is, a country that initially subsidizes its fuels, and implements a reform to eliminate or reduce 
these subsidies, will experience higher economic GDP growth. We also test if there are 
diminishing returns in terms of increased growth if fuel prices rise too much as our model 
predicts. 
The results confirm these hypotheses both from analyzing jointly all countries of all the 
World Bank Regions (cross-sectional analysis); but also the countries individually for each of 
the World Bank Regions (panel analysis). 
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Taxing fuels, or reducing fuel subsidies, will lead to higher rates of GDP per capita growth, 
especially for countries with high initial fuel subsidies, such as for most of the countries in the 
MENA region. Thus, countries that subsidize or under-tax diesel and gasoline are the most likely 
candidates to reap economic gains by subsidizing these fuels less and/or taxing them more; and 
thus gain the most by growing at higher rates. On the other hand, countries which at the outset 
have relatively high taxes on their fuels, such as most of the ECA and OECD countries, have 
somewhat less to gain from further fuel price increases; growth rates might here in fact decrease. 
The channels by which reduced energy subsidies, or the imposition of energy taxes, may 
increase economic growth are also analyzed. It is found, in particular, that reduced fuel subsidies 
at a given current period in the MENA region increase not only to contemporaneous but also 
future expenditures on health, education, and public infrastructure investments.  
Note however that in the case of the MENA countries, subsidy savings might not sustain 
higher health, education and infrastructure expenditures for long periods into the future. The 
governments in MENA countries might need to make more long-lasting reductions in fuel 
subsidies to finance permanently and stable health expenditures. In contrast, governments in the 
ECA countries seem to consistently smooth their use of their high fuel taxes to sustain public 
goods expenditures over time.  
As a consequence of these large responses of public goods expenditures to subsidy savings, 
the governments in MENA will not obviously experience much improvement in their 
government budget deficits immediately following a fuel price reform. Such improvements 
appear to be achieved, according to our empirical results, only with a two-year lag.  
Our final important empirical result is a significant positive effect of subsidy savings on 
employment and labor force participation in the MENA countries. Such effects are particularly 
strong when diesel subsidies are phased out. We found that raising diesel taxes might reduce 
labor participation in the very short run (as subsidies are removed), including the youth 
population aged 15 to 24 in the MENA countries. But as the economy adjusts and reallocates 
resources in response to the new energy prices, and with the help of better infrastructure and 
better supply of public services (which is what we find and presented below), labor market 
participation and employment increase substantially in subsequent years. 
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